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Abstract: "Legislating Market Winners" argues that
certain enacted digital signature laws are premised upon
false assumptions, and inappropriately enshrine a business
model which would not evolve naturally in the marketplace. In attempting to solve an unsolvable liability
allocation problem, such legislation harms consumers and
the future evolution of electronic commerce. The article
points out that alternative business models can solve the
liability allocation problem. Despite obvious flaws,
legislation of this type continues to be proposed, partly
because the infrastructure created by these laws coincides
with the needs of key escrow proponents. Ultimately the
article argues that digital signature laws, which impose a
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particular view of electronic commerce, should be abandoned, in Javor of laws which remove specific, welldefined barriers to electronic commerce and which allow
the electronic commerce marketplace to evolve unfettered.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The argument goes something like this: Internet commerce is
hampered by the authentication problem. There is no reliable way to
ensure that the sender of an electronic transmission is in fact who they
purport to be. Digital signatures, supported by a "public key infrastructure" of certification authorities (CAs) and certificate databases, can
solve this authentication problem. CAs will not emerge under the
current legal regime, however, because they face uncertain and
potentially immense liability exposure. Additionally, the legal status of
digitally signed documents is unclear. Therefore, legislation is needed
which defines and limits CA liability and which establishes the legality
of digitally signed documents. Such legislation will solve the authentication problem and result in robust Internet commerce.
This argument has captured an influential segment of the legal
community, and has led to the enactment of "digital signature legislation" in several U.S. states and foreign nations. Unfortunately, the
argument is built on fundamentally flawed assumptions and the
legislation enacted based upon it is correspondingly flawed. Much (but
not all) of the digital signature legislation enacted to date presumes a
vision of electronic commerce that simply is not tenable, and which
would not "naturally'' evolve in the marketplace. This legislation poses
the risk of profoundly distorting an infant market and locking in business
models which are harmful to consumers and to the future development
of electronic commerce.
The type of public key infrastructure (PKI) envisioned by many of the
existing digital signature laws is not viable. The problem is liability.
Digital signature legislation drafters have assumed that the potential
liability exposure faced by CAs is somehow a flaw of the existing legal
regime. This is an erroneous assumption: the liability exposure faced by
CAs under the "open PIG" model envisioned by legislation drafters is
a product of a business model that cannot internalize the costs associated
with its implementation. Moreover, in attempting to limit the liability
exposure of CAs, current digital signature laws shift an immense liability
burden onto consumers who use the infrastructure envisioned by these
laws. Putting this type of liability burden on consumers violates longheld tenets of public policy, and is a result which consumers would
reject in any truly ''bargained for'' transaction.
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Digital signatures will undoubtedly play a significant role in electronic
commerce. However, rather than being implemented in the "open PIG"
model envisioned by various digital signature laws, digital signatures are
more likely to be utilized under a "closed PK.I'' model. Under a closed
PK.I system, the liability problems associated with digital signatures
become much more manageable. Closed PK.I offers several other
advantages as well. This article describes the differences between open
and closed PK.I, and suggests that, in the absence of legislative
displacement, certain marketplace trends indicate that closed PK.I is
indeed the likely market winner.
The open PK.I model can and should compete against closed PK.I and
other authentication technologies, and should not be accorded special
legal status via legislation. Such legislation -is unnecessary: the
"contractual privity problem" which is used to justify open PKI
legislation is a red herring. Commercial CAs utilizing the open PK.I
model can compete in the marketplace without special PK.I legislation.
These CAs are unlikely to succeed, not because of flaws with the legal
system, but because the open PKI model is not a winning business
model.
Despite raising the very peculiar specter of regulating an essentially
nonexistent industry (CAs), and despite increased recognition of the
problems associated with the very specific vision of electronic commerce
embodied in these digital signature laws, laws based on the open PKI
model continue to be proposed and implemented. This article suggests
that one of several factors behind the continued momentum of this
legislation, particularly at the federal and international levels, is its
synergy with cryptographic "key escrow" proposals. While digital
signature legislation ostensibly addresses the use of cryptography only
for the purposes of authentication, and not for confidentiality, the
infrastructure created by these laws is ideal for implementing a key
escrow scheme.
Ultimately this article argues that digital signature laws which impose
a particular view of electronic commerce should be abandoned. Laws
which remove specific, well-defined barriers to electronic commerce-such as unnecessary ''writing" or handwritten signature
requirements-and which allow the electronic commerce marketplace to
evolve unfettered should be encouraged.
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II.

BACKGROUND: DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC KEY
CRYPTOGRAPHY

Digital signatures are a particular application of public key cryptography. No attempt will be made here to explain the rather complex
underlying technology in any detail; readers who are unfamiliar with
basic cryptographic terminology and techniques should consult some of
the many excellent sources available which can provide the relevant
technical background. 1 The importance of understanding the technology
cannot be overstated: at least some of the flaws in cryptography-related
legislation can be attributed to inadequate technical knowledge on the
part of policymakers. At the risk of oversimplifying to the point of
inaccuracy, creating a digital signature involves encrypting a numerical
representation of an electronic message with a private encryption key,
which the owner keeps secret; verifying a digital signature involves
decrypting the encrypted data using a related public encryption key,
which can be made widely available.
Lawyers have largely focused on what digital signatures can accomplish, if implemented in a particular ideal setting. If Alice signs an
electronic document with a digital signature and sends it over the
Internet to Bob, ideally Bob can be assured that, first, the message really
came from Alice. Digital signatures can provide assurance that a
message has in fact come from its purported sender, a quality called
"data origin authentication." Second, Bob could know that the message
he received is the exact message that Alice sent. A digital signature
enables a recipient of a message to verify that a message has not been
intentionally or accidentally altered during transmission, a quality known
as "message integrity." Third, Alice cannot later deny that she sent the
message. No one else could have sent the message but Alice, and Bob
can prove that unequivocally. This quality provided by digital signatures
is known as ''non-repudiation."2
Two difficult problems must be overcome in order to actually fulfill
the promise of digital signatures. The first is identification. Alice may
l. Good sources include BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: How TO KEEP
YOUR ELECTRONIC MEsSAGES PRIVATE (1995), which is highly recommended as an

excellent general introduction to the fundamentals of cryptography. Another excellent
introduction to cryptography and digital signatures is RSA Laboratories, A11swers to
Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<ftp:/lftp.rsa.com/pub/labsfaq/>. A more sophisticated and comprehensive introduction
to cryptography can be found in BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY:
PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE INC (2d ed. 1996).
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Ganley, Digital Signatures and Their Uses, 13
COMPUTERS AND SECURITY 385 (1994).
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not have sent the message to Bob at all. Instead, a forger may have
generated a cryptographic key pair, and entered the public key in a
public key database under the name "Alice." "Alice" and Bob may have
entered into some business arrangement whereby Bob performed some
service for "Alice," and "Alice" promised to pay Bob. When Bob
attempts to enforce bis electronic contract however, he will find that he
bas been the victim of fraud. Digital certificates, issued by ''trusted third
parties" called certification authorities, are one attempt to solve this
problem of identification.
Certificates are digitally-signed electronic documents issued by CAs
that attest to the connection of a public encryption key to an individual
(or other entity). The process might work like this. Alice would
generate her public and private key pair. She would then present her
public key to a CA, along with some form of identification. The CA
would check the identification and take any other steps necessary to
assure itself that Alice was indeed who she claimed to be. The CA
would then give Alice a certificate attesting to the connection between
Alice and her public key.
The CA must also somehow provide assurance that it is bound to its
public key, which is used to verify Alice's certificate. Thus, the CA
could have its own certificate, signed with the digital signature of a
"higher level" certification authority. This higher level certification
authority might be (as under some of the enacted digital signature laws)
a government agency.
When Bob received a message from Alice signed with Alice's digital
signature, be could obtain Alice's certificate either directly from Alice
or from an online database. If the signature on the message could be
verified using the public key listed in the certificate, and the CA's
signature verified as well, ideally Bob would know that a CA had
authenticated Alice's identity, and that he was not dealing with someone
else posing as Alice.
The second vexing problem presented by public key cryptography is
the security of private keys. If a forger somehow discovers Alice's
private key, that forger can digitally sign Alice's name on documents.
If a criminal discovered a certification authority's private key, that
criminal would have the means to commit widespread fraud. As a
practical matter, in any large-scale system utilizing public key cryptography some private keys will become compromised, and the certificate
containing the corresponding public key will need to be revoked.
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Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are designed to prevent people from
relying on a compromised or otherwise revoked public key/private key
pair.
A CRL is a list of public keys that have been revoked prior to their
expiration date. Jfthe private key is compromised, or the key pair is no
longer in use for some other reason, the public key would be placed on
a CRL. Thus, before Bob relied on the message that he received from
Alice, he would check to make sure that Alice's certificate was not on
aCRL.
III.

DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION

A segment of the legal community, noting the authentication problems
associated with the Internet, became increasingly enamored with the
possibilities of digital signatures. Beginning in 1992, efforts began in
earnest to develop legal rules to support the type of public key
infrastructure described above. Many of these efforts took place within
the framework of the Information Security Committee of the American
Bar Association's Section of Science and Technology (the "Information
Security Committee").3
A primary assumption of this group oflawyers was that the specter of
large, uncertain liability exposure would prevent the emergence of
commercial CAs.4 The liability problem has several aspects. First, if

3. General infonnation about the Infonnation Security Committee can be found
on the Internet at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.abanetorg/scitecb/home.hbnl>.
See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION
AUTIIORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES].
4. The effect of this Guideline [3.14] is to preclude liability for breach ofa
duty not included in these Guidelines. The role of a certification authority is
developing, and few will enter this uncharted area of business without first
having the basic rules established with sufficient clarity to enable an evaluation
of the legal risks of the new business •••. [I]his Guideline seeks to limit the
legal risk to those described in these Guidelines.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 77. The Utah Department of
Commerce reported the drafting committee of the Utah Digital Signature Law
commenting to the now-enacted amended version of the Utah Digital Signature Act:
[The Act] clarifies the liability and risk ofliability that certification authorities
bear .•.• [A] certification authority must be able to assess and manage its risk
of exposure to possible liability, and one of the principal impediments to the
emergence of certification authorities has been the uncertamty of the legal
risks such a business would undertake.
DMSION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW: TECHNICALLY AND LEGALLY SECURE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 58 (1995) [hereinafter UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW], See
also A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic
Commerce. 15 OR. L. REv. 49, 109-10 (1996).
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a criminal defrauded a CA and induced the CA to issue a false
certificate, the criminal could impose losses on a large number of third
parties who would rely on the erroneous certificate. The CA could take
every reasonable step-or even extremely costly, exceptional steps--to
confirm identity, but still issue an erroneous certificate. If every party
who relied on the certificate had a claim against the CA for any
consequent losses, the CA's potential liability could be staggering. CAs
would be forced to go to extraordinary lengths to confirm identity in
every situation in order to avoid potential liability exposure, even when
parties to a given transaction may have been satisfied with a less
rigorously-procured (and, thus, less expensive) certificate.
Additionally, CAs face potential liability for claims by parties who
rely on a certificate after the private key associated with the public key
listed in the certificate is stolen by a criminal who then creates forged
digitally-signed documents. This type of harm would be difficult for
CAs to prevent: they have little or no control over the care a "subscriber"5 takes in protecting their private key :from misappropriation. If CAs
bear this risk, it will be reflected in the price of certificates, which might
then be uneconomically high.
Lastly, CAs face catastrophic liability exposure if their private key is
compromised. If a criminal obtained a CNs private key, they could
commit widespread fraud. Additionally, once the compromise was
discovered, all certificates issued by that CA would have to be revoked
and new certificates issued, imposing costs on all the subscribers of that
CA. If CAs face liability for these potentially immense losses,
entrepreneurs might choose not to enter the CA business at all.
The liability problem was perceived to be particularly intractable
because of a "contractual privity problem." CAs could presumably enter
into contracts with their subscribers, and allocate risk between the CA
and subscriber via contract mechanisms (i.e., the CA could offer certain
limited warranties to the subscriber, and limit potential liability to an
agreed-upon amount). However, the lawyers looking at this issue
believed that CAs typically would not be able to establish a contractual
relationship with the parties who would rely on certificates, in order to

5. "Subscriber" is the term frequently applied to the individual or entity which
obtains a certificate from a CA. See, e.g., DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note
3, at 50-51.
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allocate risk by contract.6 Therefore, these lawyers concluded that
legislation was needed which set out the duties of all parties in this
public key infrastructure and which allocated liability appropriately.
The Information Security Committee planned to release a "U.S. Model
Digital Signature Act'' in June of 1995.7 Increasingly, however, some
members of the committee grew dissatisfied with the planned legislative
approach. Ultimately, for a variety ofreasons, the plan to release model
legislation was dropped. In October, 1995, the Information Security
Committee did release an Exposure Draft of its Digital Signature
Guidelines, which it described as "general, abstract statements of
principle, intended to serve as long-term, unifying foundations for digital
signature law across varying legal settings."8 The Guidelines, released
in their final version in August 1996, set out duties for CAs, subscribers,
and relying parties, consistent with the vision for a PK.I described above.
The Digital Signature Guidelines avoid talcing positions on certain
detailed issues that legislation in this area would address, however.9
In collaboration with the Information Security Committee,1° the state
of Utah began developing digital signature legislation, and the Utah
Digital Signature Act was enacted (with considerable fanfare) in March

6. See id. at 19 (noting that "[t]he relationship between a certification authority
and subscriber may be primarily contractual •••" but that "[t]he duties of a certification
authority to a third party relying on a certificate are rooted mainly in legal proscriptions
against fraud and negligent misrepresentation.").
7. The saga of the "U.S. Model Digital Signature Act'' and related developments,
summarized in the next four paragraphs of the text, is detailed in, Comment, Misplaced
Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key
lnfrastn1cture. 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143, 1164-67 (1996), and in the sources cited
therein.
8. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES 20 (Exposure Draft 1995). The Guidelines
clearly contemplate serving as a framework for legislation: the final version of the
Guidelines make several references to "implementing legislation." DIGITAL SIGNATURE
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 80, 91.
9. See, e.g., DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 80 (noting that
the Guidelines are "intentionally silent" on the duty of care required of holders of private
keys).
10, The original, 1995 Utah Act and the [now-enacted] Draft Amended Utah
Act were developed in collaboration with the Information Security Committee
of the Section of Science and Technology of the American Bar Association
(the 'ABA Committee'). The Utah Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation
Committee and the ABA Committee shared some common redactive personnel,
and the ABA Committee has for the most part taken an active and supportive
interest in the Utah Act
UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 4, at 18. The Information Security
Committee endorsed the Utah Act "in principle." Letter from Michael S. Baum, Chair,
Information Security Committee, Resolution by the Information Security Committee on
the Proposed Utah Digital Signature Legislation, Section of Science and Technology,
A.B.A. (1994) (on file with author).
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of 1995. 11 Under the Utah Act, a government agency assumes the
obligations of being a "top level" CA and is charged with policymaking,
facilitating implementation of digital signature technology, and providing
regulatory oversight of private sector CAs through a comprehensive
licensing scheme. Licensing under the Utah Act is voluntary; however,
licensed CAs are offered certain legal benefits (primarily limited
liability). The Utah Act imposes detailed duties on CAs, subscribers,
and relying parties which are consistent with the Digital Signature
Guidelines, allocates liability among these parties, and accords special
legal status to digitally-signed documents created using the services of
a licensed CA. 12
A number of states turned to the Utah Act as model digital signature
legislation, a process encouraged by the drafters of the Utah law. In
several public communications, a prominent Information Security
Committee member who was also involved in the drafting of the Utah
Act indicated that the Utah Digital Signature Act was substantively
identical to the unreleased ABA Model Digital Signature Act. In the
wake of the enactment of the Utah Act, digital signature legislation
based on the Utah law was proposed in nearly a dozen states. By mid1997 Washington and Minnesota had enacted laws which closely tracked
Utah's, and similar bills remain pending in many states.13 The Utah
Act proved influential even when not explicitly followed: California
considered and then rejected the Utah model, enacting a non-technologyspecific bill designed to address transactions with government entities.14
Early drafts of the regulations, designed to implement the California law,
closely followed the Utah model, however.
The "Utah/ABA Guidelines" model has also proven influential at the
international level. Malaysia recently enacted legislation based upon the

11. The Utah Digital Signature Act was enacted by 1995 Utah S.B. 82, creating
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1993 & Supp. 1997). It was significantly
amended by 1996 Utah S.B. 188, which repealed and reenacted large portions of the Act
The Act is found in its amended fonn at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1993
& Supp. 1997).
12. The various provisions of the Utah Act are described in detail in Comment,
supra note 7, at 1153-63.
13. The Chicago law finn McBride Baker and Coles provides an excellent
summary of enacted and pending digital signature legislation at (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://www.mbc.com/ds_sum.html>. Readers interested in detennining the latest
legislative developments should refer to that site.
14. CAL. GoV"T CODE§ 16.5 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
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Utah Act; 15 similar legislation is under consideration in Australia,
Canada, Germany, Singapore, and the European Union.16 The United
Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is also
studying Utah-style model legislation. 17
Recent legislation proposed at the federal level in the United States
and in the United Kingdom adopts the Utah/ABA Guidelines model with
an added twist: key escrow. 18 Under these proposed laws, CAs (or
TI'Ps-trusted third parties-as they are called under the U.K. bill) not
only serve to bind subscribers to their public encryption keys used for
authentication purposes, but also serve as key escrow agents, verifying
the escrowing of keys used for confidentiality purposes.
Not all legislative bodies have jumped on the Utah/ABA Guidelines
bandwagon. Several U.S. states enacted legislation which addressed
"electronic signatures" and other non-public key methods of authenticating electronic transmissions. The most thoughtful legislative effort to
date has occurred in Massachusetts, where concerns over the marketdistorting effects of Utah-style legislation led to a proposed bill which
is aimed simply at removing existing legal barriers to electronic
commerce. 19 Similarly, the influential National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is considering a uniform law
on electronic contracting and has not been receptive to arguments in
favor of a Utah-style law.

IY. OPEN PKI: THE LIABILITY "TRILEMMA"
The Utah Act and its progeny, and the ABA Guidelines, are premised
on an "open system" or "open loop" model of a PKI. The open PKI
model envisions that subscribers will obtain a single certificate from an
independent third-party CA which certifies that subscriber's identity.

15. Bill For Use OfDigital Signatures Approved, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia),
May 6, 1997, at 8.
16. The McBride Baker and Coles Web site, supra note 13, provides a good
summary of international developments as well.
17. UN Trade Law Commission Concludes Session, Adopting Model Law On
Cross-Border Insolvency, M2 PRESS\VIRE, June 4, 1997 (''the Commission also
continued its work on legal aspects of electronic commerce, including the questions of
digital signatures and certification authorities").
18. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
19. The Information Technology Division of the state of Massachusetts has
compiled an excellent set of links to PKI related documents, including their own
proposed legislation, at (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.magnetstate.ma.us/itd/legal>.
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Certificate holders will then use that certificate to facilitate transactions
with potentially numerous merchants and/or other individuals.20
As discussed above, the open PKI scenario implicates considerable
liability risk. Proponents of the open model, enamored with what digital
signatures can potentially accomplish, have attributed this risk to flaws
in the existing legal regime that must be addressed legislatively. This
conclusion is wrong. The liability exposure faced by CAs under the
open PKI model is the product of a business model that cannot
internalize the costs of the inevitable fraud that will result under any
public key-based system. The resulting liability problem is unlikely to
be solved at all in the open PKI model, and certainly cannot be solved
with any one-size-fits-all legislative solution.
Here is one aspect of the problem: if criminals can obtain something
valuable by expropriating an individual's private key, they will. There
is simply no practical way to keep private encryption keys truly secure.
Proponents of digital signature technology frequently mention the
concept of storing private keys on tamper-proof smart cards. While
smart cards, particularly smart cards that incorporated biometric
measures designed to prevent unauthorized use of a misappropriated
card, would undoubtedly promote the security of private keys, at this
point this is simply wishful thinking-this type of smart card is not
commercially deployed in any meaningful way, and is unlikely to be in
the foreseeable future. There is currently no realistic way to truly secure
private keys, and this problem is going to get worse before it gets
better.2 1

20. The "open PKI" vs. "closed PKI" nomenclature is problematic is some
respects, and is not endorsed here with great enthusiasm. An alternative formulation
might posit "Generic Identity Certification Authorities" (open PKI) against "ContextSpecific Certifiers" or "Context-Specific Certificate Issuers" (closed PKI). Additionally,
the terminology "open PKI" and "closed PKI" is not meant to imply open networks or
open standards vs. closed networks or proprietary technology, but rather to describe
specific business models. Open systems, in the more typical sense of the tenn, are
associated with larger markets, lower barriers to entry, more rapid technological progress,
and ultimately all the benefits of a more competitive market structure. This article
argues that it is the closed PKI model which can better provide such benefits.
21. Consider the seemingly endless stream of announcements concerning security
breaches in the leading commercial Web browsers, some of which would allow a
malicious hacker to access files-including potentially a private enciyption ke~tored
on the computer of an unsuspecting user. Many of these problems are cataloged at
(visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/coast.html>.

1235

Private keys will be expropriated, and third parties will rely on
ostensibly valid but fraudulent documents and suffer losses. The
aggregate losses could be quite sizable,judging from analogous contexts:
Mastercard and Visa lose over $1 billion per year to fraud; phone
companies claim to lose $3 billion a year to fraud; in the city of Los
Angeles alone fraudulent real estate document filing is said to have cost
$131 million in a twenty-seven month period.22 Who will bear these
losses? There are three primary choices: 1) the relying party; 2) the
individual whose key was used to sign the document; or 3) the CA who
performed the initial binding.
Under the Utah Act, the individual whose key was used to sign the
document bears unlimited liability if they failed to exercise "reasonable
care" to protect their private key.23 The Act also imposes difficult
evidentiary burdens on the individual. So, if a subscriber-named
"Grandmom," just to put things in perspective-does not exercise
reasonable care, and her key is stolen resulting in losses totaling $25,000
prior to revocation of her key, that subscriber bears the loss-i.e.,
Grandmom loses her house. Or, if Grandmom does exercise reasonable
care and her key is still misappropriated, she must present a court with
"clear and convincing" evidence (the standard under the Utah Act) to
overcome the presumption that a document signed with her digital
signature was in fact signed by her. In either case, the result does not
comport with well-established consumer protection laws (compare with
the legislatively-imposed $50 consumer liability limit for credit card
losses, or the fact that one cannot be bound by a fraudulent handwritten
signature).24 Moreover, no rational consumer would agree to accept
this level of risk in a marketplace transaction. The benefits of having a
certificate simply do not outweigh the very real possibility of facing
extraordinarily large unreimbursed losses.

22. In 1994 Mastercard reported a loss of $486 million due to credit card fraud;
Visa's fraud loss was $645 million. Robert Jennings, Fraud is Stealing Holiday Joy
from Credit Card Companies, AMERICAN BANKER, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1. Phone companies
estimate that they lose about $3 billion to calling card fraud and other types of fraud.
Peter Sinton, V"rsa Has Sights Set on Credit Card Fraud, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Sept. 14, 1994, at B-1. L.A. County District Attorney Gil Garcetti estimated that county
residents were cheated out of $131 million between July 1990 and November 1992.
Timothy J. Moroney, Review ofSelected 1995 California Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 451,
452 (1996).
23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-305(1) (Supp. 1997). The Utah Act does not define
''reasonable care," and no guidelines or consensus exists over what steps are appropriate
for protecting private keys.
24. These arguments are set out in detail in Comment, supra note 7, at 1167-86.
See also U.C.C. § 3-403(a) ("an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as to the
signature of the unauthorized signer'').

1236

[VOL. 34: 1225, 1997]

Digital Signature Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Yet if the subscriber does not bear full liability under this scenario,
where else would the loss fall? On the CA? They could neither prevent
the harm, nor realistically insure against such indeterminate losses via
pricing mechanisms. CAs presumably would not know whether a
particular certificate was going to be used in a purchase of a piece of
clip art or in a real estate closing. Thus, the CA could not charge a
price that would be commensurate with the CAs corresponding risk of
loss if the CA were to bear liability for fraud involving the certificate.
Could the loss fall on the relying party? The goals of a PKI would be
undermined, and an opportunity for fraudulent collusion would be
presented, if the relying party bears the risk.25
While the issues are perhaps less stark, this "liability trilemma" plays
out similarly for each liability scenario present under open PKI. If CA
liability is limited for erroneous certificates issued through no "fault'' of
the CA, who bears the risk of loss when fraud does occur? The relying
party? The individual whose name is on the certificate, despite the fact
that they may have no connection to the situation at all? What if CA
liability is limited in the event of a compromised CA private key? Will
the loss fall on any relying parties who are consequently defrauded? On
subscribers who must revoke and replace certificates?
The fundamental assertion of this article is that there is no satisfactory
solution to this problem under an open PKI model. Certainly there is no
one-size-fits-all solution that can be imposed via legislation. As further
described below, it is conceivable that market mechanisms may be able
to solve this "liability trilemma" via contracts, and the "contractual
privity problem" is no barrier to this result. However, this result is
nonetheless unlikely: the open PKI model is an inherently flawed
business model.

25. If relying parties bore the risk of loss, fraudulent collusion could occur when
a subscriber willfully discloses their private key to a criminal knowing that, existing laws
concerning fraud aside, the subscriber will not bear any resulting loss. Moreover, apart
from intentional wrongdoing, subscribers would presumably have less incentive to be
cautious with their private keys, more keys would be stolen, and, thus, the reliability of
digitally signed documents would be increasingly suspect and the envisioned PK.I would
be underutilized.

1237

V.

THE "CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY" RED HERRING

The "contractual privity problem" as a justification for open PKIoriented legislation is a red herring. At least one commercial CA,
VeriSign, has emerged unsupported by legislation, and is largely
pursuing the open PKI model. This CA is betting a substantial
investment that they can form "webwrap" or "click-through" contracts
with relying parties when the relying parties verify certificates. That is,
when relying parties connect to the VeriSign Web site to determine
whether a particular certificate has been revoked (placed on VeriSign's
CRL), they are presented with a "click through'' agreement which
defines the limited warranties VeriSign offers to relying parties on
certificates and which strictly limits VeriSign's potential liability.
VeriSign enters into a similar agreement with subscribers when the
subscriber first obtains a certificate.26
Click-through agreements are not without their problems. The
question of whether they are enforceable at all is not definitively settled,
and there can be other potential problems depending on specific
circumstances.27 However, this issue is not unique to the CA industry.

26. One aspect ofVeriSign's approach is puzzling. VeriSign attempts to bind both
subscribers and relying parties to legal tenns detailed in its Certification Practices
Statement (CPS). The Digital Signature Guidelines similarly envision a CA's CPS as
setting out the basic legal relationship between CA, subscriber, and relying parties.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 32-33. This approach is problematic.
Certification Practice Statements are fundamentally misconceived as legal docwnents;
they are full of technical infoanation that simply is not legally relevant Jwnbling up
CA-subscriber legal terms, CA-relying party legal tenns, and complex technical
infoanation in a single docwnent creates contract foanation problems that are virtually
insurmountable.
A more effective approach would be to use two short contracts: a CA-subscriber
agreement, and a CA-relying party agreement There would be only a few key
provisions in each contract warranties (both CA to subscriber/relying party as well as
covenants from subscriber or relying party to CA), warranty disclaimers, liability
limitations, indemnification, dispute resolution, and choice of law. These provisions
would not have to be drafted in a particularly complex fashion. For example, there is
no need for a CA to warrant that they will take steps A through Z, in numbing detail.
Rather, a CA can simply warrant that a particular set of facts will be true, and then scale
their liability for nonperfonnance of those promises through liability limitation
provisions. A CA could incorporate a CPS by reference into their contracts, if they
wanted to link their promises to a particular set of practices, but this really is not
necessary. A CPS would better serve as a marketing docwnent rather than a legal
document
27. See Carey R. Ramos and Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses
After ProCD v. Zeidenberg, nm COMPUTER LAWYER, Sept 1996, at 1. See also Gary
H. Moore and J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution: New Life For
'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Apr. 1996, at 1 (noting, among other
things that ''the 'on-line' version of the ubiquitous 'shrinkwrap' license stands a far
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Many online businesses are forced to rely on click-through agreements.
Several recent court decisions have strongly suggested that they will be
enforceable; a legislation-drafting effort underway is attempting to settle
the question.28 Click-through agreements present a mechanism by
which CAs can attempt to allocate risk contractually.29
Accordingly, the open PKI model can compete in the marketplace in
the absence of any special legislation. Independent commercial CAs can
form enforceable contracts with both subscribers and relying parties, via
click-through agreements, and, thus, allocate risk contractually. Various
CAs utilizing this model presumably would compete on warranty,
indemnification, liability limitation, and other contractual terms. This is
not a winning business model, however.
Even utilizing the :flexibility and dynamism of the market, CAs
practicing the open PKI model will not be able to solve the "liability
trilemma." In the long run, CAs will not be able to simultaneously offer
certificates at reasonable prices, along with contract terms acceptable to
both subscribers and relying parties. The open PKI model simply poses

greater chance of being enforced than its hard-copy cousin.").
28. Two recent federal appellate court decisions have upheld the enforceability of
"shrinkwrap" agreements using a rationale which will also support the enforceability of
"click-through" agreements. See ProCD, Inc. v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 176 (7th Cir.
Jan. 6, 1997). The National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws and
the American Law Institute are nearing completion of an amendment to the Unifonn
Commercial Code which will endorse click-through agreements. See (visited Jan. 17,
1998) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/>; Carole A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Law
on Software Transactions: Draft U.C.C. Article 2B- Licenses (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://www.softwareindustiy.org/issues/guide/index.html>.
29. A similar mechanism for allocating risk via contract mechanisms is discussed
in David G. Masse and Andrew D. Fernandes, Economic Modelling and Risk
Management in Public Key Infrastructures ,i 178 (Version 3.0, Apr. 15, 1997) (visited
Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.chait-amyot.ca/docs/pki.html>. This thoughtful paper,
presented at the RSA Data Security, Inc. annual symposium in San Francisco on January
31, 1997, touches on many of the same issues presented in this article, although it
reaches some different conclusions. One potential hitch with the scenario described here
is if a court honors a relying party's claim against a CA, in a circumstance where the
relying party failed to check a CRL, or where a relying party relied on an expired
certificate which the CA no longer maintained on a CRL, and, thus, did not enter into
a contract with the CA. This result seems unlikely, however, in light of the ''unreasonableness" of not checking a CRL or relying on an expired certificate; a court would
likely determine that such actions constituted an assumption of risk ofloss by the relying
party, at least as between the relying party and the CA. If this result were to
consistently occur it could be dealt with in focused legislation.
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too much inherent risk of loss that must be borne by one of these three
parties.

VI. THE

CLOSED

PK.I MODEL

To assert that open PK.I is not viable is not to say that public key
cryptography will not play an important role in electronic commerce.
The closed PK.I model offers some significant benefits, and will likely
compete and win in the marketplace for use in a variety of applications.
A closed PK.I has been defined as a system wherein a contract or a
series of contracts identifies and defines the rights and responsibilities of
all parties to a particular transaction.Jo This definition came about in
response to the assumption that the "contractual privity problem"
prevented contract formation with relying parties in an open system. As
discussed above, this is an erroneous assumption: CAs can form
contracts with relying parties in an open system. Thus, a better
definition of a closed system is one where public key mechanisms are
used within a specific, bounded context.JI
Risk management is the critical area of difference between closed and
open PK.I. Within a bounded context the liability allocation problems
which are intractable under the open model become manageable,
primarily because potential liability exposure is quantifiable and limited
in scope. For example, the proprietor of an online "mall" might issue
certificates to potential customers and to merchants. The proprietor,
acting as a CA, has the opportunity to enter into contractual relationships
both with consumers and with the merchants who will rely on the
certificates, and, thus, can allocate risk contractually. Moreover, the risk
to be allocated is relatively small. Unlike under the open model, the CA
knows exactly what the certificates that are issued will be used for. The
CA can accurately predict and manage potential losses, and either absorb
this cost via pricing mechanisms, or assign it to either subscribers or
merchants by contract.
Similarly, a merchant might issue certificates directly to its customers.
The owner of an online magazine, for example, might mail diskettes
containing certificates directly to subscribers of the paper version of the
same magazine. Such certificates could be installed on the subscriber's
Web browser and used to access the online magazine, and perhaps to
30. This definition was used in the Repon of the ILPF Working Group on
Certification Authority Practices, at app. 2 (draft Feb. 24, 1997) (visited Jan. S, 1998)
<http://www.ilpf.org/work/ca/draft.htm>. For more infonnation about the Internet Law
and Policy Forum, see (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.ilpf.org>.
31. Note that some problems and alternative fonnulations exist with the
open/closed PKI nomenclature. See supra note 20.
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order related merchandise. The magazine vendor would be well
positioned to determine whether such certificates would be sufficiently
trustworthy for the purposes for which they were being used. Again,
such a scenario does not implicate the difficult risk allocation questions
associated with the open model.
Another example might be a business-to-business trading network.
Businesses may have processes and equipment in place which enables
them to carefully manage private encryption keys. They may thus be
quite willing to agree to contract terms much more "onerous" than the
terms imposed by the Utah Act, for example. A business might agree
to be strictly liable for all documents signed with its private key, under
the appropriate circumstances. A closed PKI system preserves this type
of flexibility.
In addition to better risk management capabilities, the closed PKI
model offers another benefit: the ability of a certifying entity to
realistically certify attributes or authority as opposed to identity. As
other commentators have described, the seemingly mundane concept of
identity "is a very subtle notion whose nuances go to the very core of
human social and economic interaction."32 CAs practicing the open
model are unable to capture these nuances, and instead bind public keys
to identification information that is frequently irrelevant in an online
transaction. Who a person is--in the sense of knowing, say, their name
and address-may be less relevant than knowing whether they have
authority to act on a corporation's behalf, or whether they are entitled to
access a particular online resource, or whether an account they have is
valid. The closed PKI model can manage both the logistics and risk
associated with attribute or authority certificates; the open PKI model
cannot.33
Stephen Kent gave a fascinating talk last year entitled "Let a Thousand
(Ten-Thousand?) CAs Bloom,"34 and his central theme deserves

32. Masse and Fernandes, supra note 29, at 'If 106. See also Carl Ellison,
Establishing Identity Without Certification Authorities (July 22-25, 1996) (visited Jan.
17, 1998) <http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/usenix.html>.
33. Masse and Fernandes, supra note 29, at 'If 123; see also id. at 'If 126 et seq.
(discussion of "credential certificates").
34. Stephen Kent is a well-known and highly respected cryptographer affiliated
with BBN Corporation. The presentation was given at the DIMACS Workshop on Trust
Management in Networks on September 30, 1996. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Management/program.html> for a description of
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repeating: let anyone who wants to be a CA be a CA, certifying their
own customers, employees, members, etc. Individuals do not need one
overarching identity certificate, to be used in every conceivable
circumstance. People can have many certificates, inconspicuously
installed in a Web browser, each of which is used in a specific, narrow
context. Within the confines of such a bounded context the risk
allocation questions which are insurmountable under an open PK! model
become much, much easier. Moreover, unlike the rigid, hierarchical
structure of an open PK!, such a scenario embraces the chaotic, fastpaced environment of the Internet.
Market trends appear to support the conclusion that the closed model
will be the winner in the marketplace. Recall the flurry of announcements concerning commercial CA services which took place in early
1996. VeriSign was spun off from RSA. GTE CyberTrust announced
its imminent competing "CyberSign" service. Nortel began issuing
demonstration sever certificates, and was rumored to be on the verge of
launching full-blown CA activities. MCI, AT&T, and IBM all hinted at
planned CA services.35 The U.S. Postal Service announced its intentions to act as a CA.36
Look at the state of the commercial CA marketplace now. CyberTrust
finally started issuing certificates in early 1997-but only for SET,37
which presumably will leverage the risk allocation mechanisms already
present in the bank card industry. The CyberSign service, based on the
open PK! model, has evidently been abandoned in favor of CyberTrust's
emphasis on their "customer branded service."38 CertCo, a Bankers

the conference. Kent's presentation is summarized at (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/ManagementlKent.hlinl>.
35. For example, in early 1996 Netscape Navigator version 2.x came equipped to
recognize certificates issued by MCI, AT&T, and others. Froomkin, supra note 4, at
112.
36. Shawn P. McCarthy, Postal Service Can Time-Stamp Certified Mail As E-Mail,
Safely, GoVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, November 18, 1996, at 39.
37. SET is the Secure Electronic Transactions protocol promoted by Visa and
Mastercard, among others. For links to basic information about SET, as well as a
thoughtful and provocative criticism of the SET effort, see Simson Garfinkel, Is the Web
Set for SET?, HoTWIRED: PACKET (June 18, 1997) <http://www.hotwired.com/packet/
garfinkel/>.
38. In response to an early draft on this article, Tom Carty, Vice President of
Business Development & Marketing for GTE CyberTrust, e-mailed the author and wrote:
GTE strongly endorses the closed PKI model. This has been reflected in
CyberTrust's architecture from the beginning in the form of Customer Branded
Service which is based on or Virtual Certification Authority (YCA) technology. This closed form of PKI service has been adopted by a number of our
customers and is well suited to many of the business needs today. We believe
business customers have established relationships with many of their customers
and are in the best position to determine who should receive a certificate for
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Trust spin-off and a newer entrant into the CA industry, appears to be
focused largelf on a contract-oriented model.39 The rumors of Nortel's
(now Entrust4") inlpending entry into the CA business proved false.
Entrust's services focus exclusively on back-end support for other
companies that want to offer CA services. Likewise, IBM's offerings
focus on back end support.41 The Postal Service's plans never materialized. All of these developments are consistent with the dominance of
the closed PKI model. Industry players are focusing their attention on
"letting ten-thousand CAs bloom."
VeriSign is the only North American company that is actively
pursuing the classic open PKI model as a business model. Indeed,
judging from their press releases they are doing so with some success,
and they are planning innovative ways of addressing problematic aspects
of their business model, such as via a recently-announced limited
insurance plan for subscribers. However, even VeriSign used the highprofile forum provided by the 1997 RSA Data Security Conference to
announce its ''Private Label Digital ID Services," which are back-end
support for companies that want to offer CA services.42 Thus, even
VeriSign is focusing on offering its services to other companies on an
outsourcing basis, consistent with the closed PKI model.
VII.

OPEN PKI LEGISLATION LIVES ON

Despite increased recognition of the problems associated with the open
PKI model, legislation enshrining this model in law and regulation
continues to be proposed and enacted. This can partly be attributed to
factors that could be labeled "psychological." The rigid, straightforward
hierarchies inherent in the open model are likely deeply appealing to the
operating with them as business clients.
E-mail message from Tom Carty, Vice President, GTE CyberTrust, to C. Bradford
Biddle, (May 26, 1997) (on file with author). Other senior executives from companies
active in the certification authority industty also responded with similar comments.
39. See Chris Jones, Banking Spin-Offto Issue Digital Ids: CertCo 's Software Will
Distribute Electronic Transaction Risk, INFOWORLD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 21.
40. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.entrustcom> for more information.
41. See (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.intemet.ibm.com/commercepoint/
registty/index.html>.
42. VeriSign Provides Custom Digital ID Services to Large Corporate Customers:
NOVUS Services and Toppan Printing of Japan Among Those to Select VeriSign to
Provide Digital Authentication Services for Internet Customers, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 27,
1997) <http://www.verisign.com/pr/pr_large.html>.
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sensibilities of lawyers and legislators as they contemplate the often
chaotic and inscrutable Internet. Moreover, enacting legislation-even
legislation that is not well-understood----satisfies the legislative urge to
"do something" in the face of a rapidly changing economic environment.
Additionally, legislators may be under the mistaken impression that
special legal rules are needed to accommodate electronic commerce. In
fact, however, the law is quite flexible and supportive of new commercial methods.43 The oft-heard assertion that enforceable electronic
contracts cannot be formed in the absence of a legislatively-endorsed
digital signature is simply wrong.44 As a general matter, legislation is
not needed in order to accommodate public key cryptography or other
emerging authentication technologies. The few areas where existing
legal rules impede electronic commerce can be addressed with narrow,
targeted legislation.45
Another factor behind the continued momentum of open PKI digital
signature legislation is less benign: the infrastructure created by such
legislation is ideally suited for implementation of a key escrow scheme.
Indeed, such an idea was initially broached by the Clinton Administration in a report released in May of 1996. This report described a vision
for a PK.I consistent with the Utah/ABA Guidelines model, and noted:
To participate in the network a user needs a public key certificate signed by a
CA which ''binds" the user's identity to their public key. One condition of
obtaining a certificate is that sufficient information (e.g., P,rivate keys or other
information as appropriate) has been escrowed with a certified escrow authority
to allow access to a user's data or communications. (As noted before, this might
be the CA or an independent escrow authority) ••••46

43. See Benjamin Wright, Electronic Commerce Legislation: Frequently Asked
Questions, CYBERSPACE LAWYER., Apr. 1997, at 10. See also Peter N. Weiss, Security
Requirements and Evidentia,y Issues in the Interchange ofElectronic Documents: Steps
Towards Developing a Security Policy, reprinted in XII JOHN MARSHALL JOURNAL OF
COMPUTER AND INFORMATION LAW 425 (1993).
44. This point is made quite effectively, and examples of the misinformed
conventional wisdom are given, in BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, EDI, E-MAIL, AND INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND LIABILITY§§ ET
1.1, 1.4, 1.5 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1996).
45. The draft legislation in Massachusetts provides an example of le.(:islation
narrowly tailored to provide clarity concerning issues such as signature, writing, and
records requirements. See Massachusetts Electronic Records and Signature Act (draft
Nov. 4, 1997), (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.magnetstate.ma.us/itd/legaV
mersa.htm>.
46. Executive Office of the President, Office ofManagement and Budget, Enabling
Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure
(May 20, 1996), (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/white_
paper.html>.
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Draft legislation designed to implement such a plan was released in
April, and a bill was introduced in the Senate in June.47 Similar
legislation was introduced in the United Kingdom.48 The profound
civil liberties concerns implicated by such legislation, and the negative
effects on commerce of the policies underlying key escrow, are well
documented.49
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The open PKI model envisioned by many existing and proposed
digital signature laws is not viable. This legislation presumes a business
model that cannot internalize the costs associated with its implementation. In attempting to solve an unsolvable problem, current digital
signature laws shift an immense liability burden onto consumers who use
the infrastructure envisioned by these laws. Consumers would reject this
result in any true marketplace transaction.
Digital signatures will play a significant role in electronic commerce,
but under a closed PKI system where the liability problems associated
with digital signatures become manageable. The open PKI model can
and should compete against closed PKI and other authentication
technologies without the benefit of special legislation. It will not,
however, be the winning business model.
Digital signature laws which impose a particular view of electronic
commerce on the marketplace should be abandoned. The time for
legislation and regulation is after identifiable problems exist in a mature
industry, not before an industry even exists. The existing legal infrastructure can accommodate new technologies without dramatic new legislation. Premature legislation and regulation risks creating market
distortions which can prevent the market from arriving at much better
results than those envisioned by governmental policymakers. Certainly
this is true in the case of open PKI: digital signature legislation based
47. S. 909, the McCain-Kerrey "Secure Public Networks Act," was approved by
the Senate Commerce Committee on June 20, 1997. Secure Public Networks Act, S.909,
105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). See also (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.cdtorg/
crypto/> (containing details concerning the draft legislation released in April and for
updated information concerning S. 909).
48. See (visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http://dtiinfo.dti.gov.uk/pubs/>.
49. See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow," 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 15, and sources cited therein.
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on the Utah/ABA Guidelines model imposes a business model which
could not survive under the discipline of the marketplace.
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